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THE LOSS OF SERVITUDES BY ABANDONMENT.
It is undoubtedly true that as. the right of property may be
acquired in certain cases by occupation, so the right may in all
cases be lost by abandonment. There are certain tights the existence and continuance of which -depend upon occupation. Such is
the right to the enjoyment of the elements of air and -water, which
are common to'all. So far as the exclusive right to any portion
of running waters, which" are' publici .uris, depends upon occupation, that must be continued ; and when the occupation ceases, it
returns to its former state, and again becomes conimon to all. The
right of the occupant is at an end, except so far as it'is preserved
upon a declared or a presumed intention by operation of law.
It was upon this principle that the decision was founded in a
case decided by the Court of Common Pleas: Liggins vs. Inge,
7 Bingh. R. 682. Mr.. Chief Justice TINDAL said, in that case,
that there was nothing unreasonable in holding that a right which
is gained by occupancy should be lost by abandonment. Suppose,
he says, a person who formerly had a mill upon a stream should
pull it down and remove the works, with the intention never to
return; could it be held that the owner of other land adjoining the
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stream might not erect a mill and employ the water so relinquished,
or that he could be compellable to pull down his mill, if the former
millowner should afterwards change his determination and wish to
rebuild his own ? The learned Judge considered the question of
abandonment as one of fact for the jury, and was of opinion that
an open and express declaration of the intention of abandonment
would be sufficient protection to a new occupant, who had erected
a mill in reliance upon the extinction of the former right. The
right supposed to be relinquished is not acquired by grant or prescription from the other proprietors of the stream, and when it is
shown that it is absolutely abandoned in any mode, the occupation
which is necessary to the maintenance of the right ceases; then,
there is nothing to prevent a new and distinct right from being
acquired by occupation.
In Lawrence vs. Obee, 3 Campb. 514, and in Thomas vs. Hill,
31 Maine 152, a prescriptive right was gained by an adverse party
after the supposed abandonment. And when, as in Drewett vs.
Sheard, 7 Car. & P. 465, a party had acquired a right to use a
larger wheel and a greater flow of water, and afterwards discontinued the larger wheel, and resumed the smaller wheel to which
he was before entitled, he was held to have abandoned the right to
the use of the larger wheel. This case may perhaps be justified
on the ground that an adverse right was acquired by occupancy.
And if, in a case where the abandonment may not be shown to
have been made with the intention to relinquish the right, the
former owner, after notice, permits a new occupant to proceed in
expensive works, in reliance upon the fact of abandonment, certainly he would have no claim to favor, from a court either of law
or equity.
In the case of Stokoe vs. Singers, 8 Ellis & BI. 31, the doctrine
was asserted that a party entitled to the easement of lights, who,
after having disused his right for a length "of time, has given occasion to a neighboring proprietor to make expensive improvements,
with a view to such supposed abandonment, was precluded from
resuming the exercise of his easement. Lord CAMPBELL said
that the case of Regina vs. Chorley, 12 Q. B. 515 (post, p. 518),
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was an authority that "an abandonment is effectual, if communicated and acted upon. It goes no further."
In Ururn vs. Fox, 16 Barb. 184, where one had a right of way
to a house across another's land, and after twelve years enclosed
the way and cultivated it, the way was held to be abandoned ; but
as no equitable right had sprung up, and no adverse right exercised, there would seem to have been no abandonment.
The doctrine that a right which is acquired by occupation may
be lost by abandonment, was applied, in another case, to the servitude of lights, upon a principle much less satisfactory. It was
held in the King's Bench (K-oore vs. 1awson, 3 B. & C.332), that
a right to lights might be lost by a disuser for a time less than
twenty years, under circumstances which showed the intent of
abandonmeit, as where a party had the enjoyment of light and
air by means of certain windows in the wall of his house, and
upon the site of the wall he built a blank wall Without any windows. Things continued in this state for seventeen years. The
defendant, in the mean time, erected a building opposite the plaintiff's blank wall, and then the plaintiff opened a window in that,
which had continued for so long a period a blank wall without
windows, and thereafter brought his action for the darkening of
his windows by the buildings which the defendant had so erected.
The Court were of opinion if a person entitled to ancient lights
builds a blank wall in their place, and suffers it to remain for a
considerable period of time, that an abandonment of the right is
to be presumed, and that if a temporary disuse alone was intended,
he was bound to show that the abandonment wai not perpetual;
and the Court relied much, as a reason for this rule, upon the consideration that the building of the blank wall might have induced
another person to become the purchaser of the adjoining ground
for building, and that it would be unjust to prevent him from carrying that purpose into effect. It must be confessc that this is a
very unsatisfactory reason for the general doctrine, however proper
it might be that it should influence the decision of a court of equity
in the case of a purchase of land for the purpose of building, without notice of an existing servitude. One of the Judges, Mr. Jus-

516
tice

LOSS OF SERVITUDES BY ABANDONMENT.

LITTLEDALE, was of opinion that if a party who had acquired
a right to ancient lights by grant, ceases for a long period of time
to make use of the privilege so granted to him, it may then be
presumed that he has released the right. In answer to the argu
ment, that, as he could only acquire the right by twenty years'
enjoyment, it ought not to be lost without disuse for the same
period ; and that, as enjoyment for such a length of time is necessary to found a presumption of a grant, there must be a similar
non-user to raise a presumption of a release ; he said that reasoning might apply, perhaps, to a right of common or of way, but
that there was a material distinction between the mode of acquiring
such rights and a right to light and air; that the latter was
acquired by mere occupancy, the former only by user accompanied
by the consent of the owner of the land. This, which is the principal ground for the decision, is extremely unsatisfactory; for
though there is a material difference between the circumstances
under which a right to unobstructed lights and a right of way or
of common is acquired, they are each founded on a grant express
or presumed. The right to unobstructed lights is not in any sense
acquired by occupancy,.but, when not arising from an express covenant, depends altogether upon the presumption of a grant resulting from length of time. It is wrong to say that even the right
of the owner to place lights in his wall is gained by occupancy,
like the use of water in certain cases : it is a right incident to
property, which an owner may exercise or not, at his pleasure.
The right to prevent the owner of adjoining land from enjoying
fully his proprietary right of building to any height on his own
land is different, and it is this which is acquired by a covenant or
grant express or presumed. The negative servitude which has
once vested on the presumption resulting from long user is of the
same character as if created by express grant. It is not at all like
a right in running water, which depends upon a continued occupancy. It can only be released by a deed inter partes, or by
matter in pais, such as shows the intent to abandon the right. No
disposition of property which causes a cesser of the use of a right
which is incident to it, can produce that effect, unless the intention

LOSS OF SERVITUDES BY ABANDONMEiENT.

to abandon the right is shown. It would seem that on principle
the servitude in question was an absolute right of prcperty, which
could no more be lost by disuser than any other proprietary right,
unless continued so long as to raise the presumption of a grant or
release. It is even a question under the civil law, whether the
right can be lost by mere length of time, without some act on
the part of the owner of the servient tenement contrary to the
servitude itself. The effect of the decision in this case would
seem to be (so far, at least, as it regards the law of England)
to establish, in respect to the servitude of ancient lights, the
anomalous rule that it may be lost by non-user ; for any ",considerable time," in the words of ABBOTT, C. J., and that in
order to prevent this result, it would be necessary for the owner
of the lights to show that he intended to resume the enjoyment of
them within a " reasonable time." What such considerable time on
the one hand, or reasonable time on the other, shall be, does not
appear; nor.by what evidence it shall be shown that the party
intends to resume the enjoyment; whether possession must be
maintained by vestiges, as in certain cases under the French law,
or whether it will be sufficient if the owner of the dominant tenement declares his intention not to abandon the right, but to resume
its exercise at some future time.
In the case of Lowell vs. Smith, 3 0. B. N. S. 120, the plaintiff, having a right of way by prescription more than thirty years
before the action, agreed with the owner and occupier of the servient tenement, that the use of a portion of that way should be discontinued, and a new one eqlually convenient to him should be sub
stituted for it.

The agreement for a substitution failed by reason

of the infincy and coverture of a party whose consent was necessary thereto. The plaintiff therefore fell back upon his original
right. The Court were of opinion that there was nothing from
which an abandonment could be inferred, except the exercise of
the right over the new way, and that was clearly not sufficient.
WILLES, J., said: cI do not think that this Court means to lay
chown that there can be an abandonment of a prescriptive easement
hke this without a deed or cyidence from which a jury can presume
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a release of it: but the facts show no intention to abandon legally
or popularly." There was clearly no abandonment, but rather an
unexecuted agreement for a substitution.
The question, what acts constitute the abandonment of a servitude, is one of fact for the triers. Every species of incorporeal
right may be abandoned, but a mere disuser can have that effect
only where the right depends upon occupation. The right of way
may be abandoned when it is shown that the intention to abandon the way accompanies the disuser. In a case where a party
entitled to a private right of way had permitted the public to
use the way in a manner inconsistent with the private right
(The Queen vs. Chorley, 12 Q. B. Rep. 515), the Court held that
as an express release of the easement would destroy it at any moment, so the cesser of use, coupled with any act clearly indicative
of an intention to abandon the right, would have the same effect,
without any reference to time; that the period of time was only
material as one element from which the party's intention to retain
or abandon his easement might be inferred against him; and that
what period might be sufficient in any particular case must depend
on all the accompanying circumstances. There are certain cases
where it may be uncertain whether a party who makes such a disposition of his property as renders an easement unnecessary or
useless to him, intends absolutely to abandon the right or to relinquish the privilege during its temporary disuse. It would seem
that ordinarily when the works which prevent the beneficial
enjoyment of an easement are removed, the possession would be
restored, the right not being abandoned, but the possession suspended by such works. In the case mentioned by writers on
the Civil Law,' where the owner of a house has secured his light
from being obstructed, by a covenant from a neighboring proprietor not to raise his house to a greater height, the former, by
the erection of a building between the two houses, renders the
negative servitude altius non tollendi ineffectual against his neighbor, and his remedy is gone; but if the intermediate house is destroyed by fire or taken down, the servitude revives, and a right
'Domat, Tome 1, Tit. 12, Sect. 6, Art. 4.
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of action will exist for the breach of the covenant. In such a
case there exists, as a necessary effect, a suspension of the servitude, but not an abandonment. Something more is necessary to
show the intention of abandonment.
The doctrine stated in the Commentaries of Mr. Chancellor
Kent, Vol. 3, page 449, is not inconsistent with this principle. If
the act, it is said, which prevents the servitude, be incompatible
with the nature or exercise of it, and be by the- party to whom the
servitude is due, it is sufficient to extinguish it, and if it be extinguished for a moment it is gone for ever. In the case above supposed, the act of the party to whom the servitude is due is not
incompatible with the right. It merely suspends the cause of
action during the existence of the intermediate building. The
case cited by the author of the Commentaries-as authority for the
doctrine, is very questionable: Taylor vs. Hampton, 4 McCord
Rep. 96. The defendant Hampton had purchased of Pinckney,
in 1807, one hundred and fifteen acres of land, with a mill-pond,
dam, and mill in full operation, which continued till 1814. The
pond flowed the land of the plaintiff, and the defendant had a
right to this flow as a servitude by prescription.
In 1814, a
new mill was erected by the defendant, above the place where the
old mill stood, upon which the water of the old mill flowed; and
therefore the lower dam was cut, the water let off, and its use as a
mill abandoned by its owner. This dam was, however, immediately repaired, and the water raised occasionally for the purpose
of flowing rice; but in general the plaintiff's land was relieved
from the former flow, from 1814 to 1823, when the upper mill was
burnt, and the old mill was rebuilt in the former place, the water
being again permanently raised, and the flow resumed over the
plaintiff's land. An action was brought for that injury, and the
verdict being for the plaintiff, on a motion for a new trial, NOTT,
J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented
was, whether the erection of the upper mill, the existence and
enjoyment of that being incompatible with the use of the other
mill bV means of this. pond, did not extinguish the right of flow
formerly enjoyed by the defendant. The Court came to the con-
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elusion that an extinguishment of the servitude was effected by this
act. The ground upon which the Court proceeded was, that the
erection of the upper mill operated as an extinguishment of the
right, because, during its existence, it was incompatible with the
exercise of the servitude in question. But the statement of the
case shows that the exercise of the right only was suspended, and
that its disuse was only temporary. So fdr as the intention was
to be inferred from the buildings which were incompatible with the
right, the intention to suspend the exercise of the servitude only
was shown. Some further evidence was required -to prove the
abandonment. The Code of Louisiana, Art. 246, which declares
the principle of the civil law on the subject, and which was relied
upon in this case, as in conformity with the rule of the common
law, says " that servitudes are extinguished when things are in such
a situation that they can no longer be used, and when they remain
perpetually in that situation. But if things are re-established in
such a manner that they may be used, the servitude will only be
suspended." By a temporary disuser the possession is suspended,
but the right is not abandoned; and the suspension is made to
depend upon the continuance of the state of things which is inconsistent with its exercise. It may depend upon the intention of the
party whether an abandonment is effected by a disuser, but the
intention must be shown as a fact by other circumstances than such
as are for a time only incompatible with the exercise of the righi.
In this very case, the result showed that the use merely was suspended. If the owner of the dominant tenement had declared
that on the erection of the new mill he abandoned the servitude,
that might have extinguished the right, so that when the mill was
afterwards burnt, the proprietor would have been precluded from
his right to flow the land; but there was no such communication
between the parties, nothing which could operate as a release, and
the natural effect of the new disposition of the property was
merely to suspend possession.
A case was stated by the Court from Jacobs L. D. 448, tit.
Extinguishment, Vol. 1: A. has a stream of water which runs
through a leaden pipe; if B. purchases the land and destroys the
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pipe, the watercourse is extinct, because by this he declares his
intent and purpose that he will not enjoy them together. The
intent in such a case would have been a question of fact for the
jury. But if other works established by B. had, during their
existence, rendered the flow of the water impossible, the nonuser of the right would have operated only as a temporary suspension, if, in the event, the works which caused the obstruction were
removed. Even if the pipes by whicl the water was conducted
were destroyed, there would be nothing in such an act in pais, to
prevent the resumption of possession, unless the intention to
abandon appeared : cessante causa cessat effectus. A very different
question would be presented by a case in which the owner of the
servient tenement, in reliance upon a presumed abandonment, bad
acquired rights inconsistent with a resumption of the servitude. It
might have been otherwise, also, if there had been a claim of a
reciprocal servitude.'
'The only inquiry in this case was, whether the party, by the
erection of" works which might have been and were designed to be
1 .. Sipp,.e a lerson," said Mr. Jusice NOTT, '"to be the owner of a house with
ancient lighzs, which no person has a right to obstruct. If he erects a house
or 1,:uts up a wall directly covering his window, has be not extinguished his light
hit-clf as effcetually as if he hatl bluwed out his candle? Surely then it would
amount to the same thing, to put up a similar building on his adjoining lot. Suppose A. to have a right of way over the land of B. If he erects a house on his own
land, in such a manner as to obstruct the passage into the lands of B., does he not
effectually destroy his right of way? Can he claim a right, the enjoyment of
Vhich he has rendered impossible by his own act? Suppnse, in the case before
us. the .ef,: lant, instead of purchasing a mill-pond, with the right of flowing the plaintiff's land, had purchased arable land. with a riglt of wat to haul
away his crop. If he had crected tie mill which le now has, and thrown tie whole
of his lanml under water, by converting it into a pond, would he not have des.r. ycd
Ilis r~g:t of way ? MIust Mr. rintikucy have krpt ,pen a road wh;ich terminated at
tn imipams.able lake, a way which the owner himself had voluntarily dcstroyed ?
The defendant has. by his own free will and accord, -bandoned the privilege to
which he was entitled. ire has cut away his dam, drawn off the water, and turned
his pond into an arable field; he btas obstructed the natural current of the creak,
sud tur-d it ;into other chanuel, : he has built a permanent v:.htablc mill on the
tand belbr! overf'uwed by the pan-1: he has thus relinquished the privileges to
wlih hc ,;as ctti:!e-l, for others which are admitted to be incompatible with the
former state of tiings."

